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COMMENTS
ACTION EN DESAVEU - CHALLENGING THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE HUSBAND'S PATERNITY
The Civil Code provides three alternative methods for a child
to prove filiation to a married woman and establishes an almost
irrefutable presumption of paternity by her husband.' Because
the husband is usually in fact the father of children born to his
wife, application of the presumption achieves just results in most
cases. However, if biological fact is contrary to the presumption,
indiscriminate application of it is questionable.2 In theory the
action en desaveu, whereby a husband disavows paternity of his
wife's child, is available as a remedy if biological fact and the
presumed paternity are incongruent;8 in practice it is difficult
for a husband to succeed in an action en desaveu. Recent decisions concerning this action provoke inquiry into the scope
and strength of this presumption of the husband's paternity.
This Comment examines two aspects of this troublesome area:
requirements of proof and admissibility of evidence to rebut the
presumption of the husband's paternity; and the possibility of
judicial remedy other than the action en desaveu.
REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF THE HUSBAND'S PATERNITY

The Louisiana Civil Code has been thought to provide five
separate grounds for an action en desaveu :1 if the wife has committed adultery and concealed the child's birth from the husband;5 if the child is born less than 180 days after marriage;6
1. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 193-196, 184 (1870).
2. Louisiana courts are not unique in producing controversial decisions on
questions of filiation. Courts employing the common law presumption that a
child born in lawful wedlock is legitimate sometimes reach startling conclusions.
In a recent California case, the court held the husband was the father of the child,
although blood group tests conclusively proved that he was not; the child's conception occurred under circumstances from which California conclusively presumes
legitimacy. Wareham v. Wareham, 195 Cal. App. 2d 64 (1961). The dissenting
judge commented: "This whole situation is a perfect example of what occurs
when truth and justice are not equated. Any law which bypasses, ignores, or
disregards a manifest truth should be forthwith changed." Id. at 88.
3. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 186-192 (1870).
4. Comments, 13 LA. L. REV. 587 (1952), 14 LA. L. REV. 401 (1953).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 185 (1870).
6. Id. art. 186. See also id. art. 190.
[759]
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if the child is born 300 or more days after the dissolution of the
marriage,7 or separation from bed and board ;8 or if the "remoteness" of husband from wife has made cohabitation physically
impossible.0
Certain recent decisions suggest that "remoteness" is not
only a separate ground for an action en desaveu but also an element the husband must prove to disavow paternity for adultery
and concealment. 0 An analysis of the jurisprudence to consider
the validity and status of this idea is in order.
Interpretationof Articles 185 and 189
The courts' interpretation of Article 18511 and Article 18912
has manifested a progressive retreat from evidence. 13 Proof of
7. Id. art. 187. Whether the heirs of a deceased husband must bring an action
en desaveu against a child born to his widow more than 300 days after his death
has been questioned. Comment, 13 LA. L. REV. 587 (1952). In Succession of
Israel, 146 So. 2d 53 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, the court, without
recourse to dialectics, treated as illegitimate a child born two years after the
husband's death.
8. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 187, 188 (1870) ; Kaufman v. Kaufman, 146 So. 2d
199 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Singley v. Singley, 140 So. 2d 546 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1962). The cases are the first reported Louisiana cases allowing a disavowal
of paternity for any reason. The court in Singley declared that the child -born 300
days after separation is presumed to be illegitimate. 140 So. 2d at 553. The court
in Kaufman said more precisely that the child is presumed not to be the husband's
child in the absence of proof of cohabitation after a decree of separation from
bed and board. 146 So. 2d at 201. In this situation, the presumption of the husband's paternity is defeated by his judicial denial of paternity. See 1 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE) no. 1429 (1959) [hereinafter cited as PLANIOL]. But he must bring
a timely action en desaveu. Kuhlman v. Kuhlman, 137 La. 263, 68 So. 604
(1915) ; McNeely v. McNeely, 147 La. Ann. 1321, 17 So. 928 (1895).
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 189 (1870). Remoteness has been interpreted to mean
physical distance. See Ellis v. Henderson, 204 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Williams
v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956) ; Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62
So. 2d 119 (1952) ; Lejeune v. Lejeune, 184 La. 837, 167 So. 747 (1936) ; Suc-

cession of Barth, 178 La. 847, 152 So. 543 (1934) ; Switzer v. Switzer, 170 La.
550, 128 So. 477 (1930) ; Succession of Ledet, 122 La. 220, 47 So. 506 (1908) ;
Vernon v. Vernon's Heirs, 6 La. Ann. 242 (1851) ; Tate v. Penne, 7 Mart.(N.S.)
548 (La. 1829) ; Singley v. Singley, 140 So. 2d 546 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962);
Harris v. Louisiana Oil Ref. Corp., 127 So. 40 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930). But see
Gillies v. Gillies, 144 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
10. See Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956) ; Gillies v.
Gillies, 144 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Trahan v. Trahan, 142 So. 2d
571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 185 (1870) (disavowal for adultery and concealment).
12. Id. art. 189 (disavowal for remoteness).
13. Article 185: Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956)
Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1.952) ; Lejeune v. Lejeune, 184 La.
837, 167 So. 747 (1936).
Article 189: Succession of Ledet, 122 La. 220, 47 So. 506 (1908) (husband
disappeared in Mexico; wife remained in Louisiana) ; Succession of Saloy, 44 La.
Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1.892) (husband remained in Cuba; wife lived in open
concubinage in Louisiana) ; Vernon v. Vernon's Heirs, 6 La. Ann. 242 (1851)
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adultery in Lejeune v. Lejeune'4 was sufficient to gain the husband a divorce, but his attempt to disavow paternity failed. The
court reasoned that he knew of his wife's pregnancy - judicially
admitted in divorce proceedings - and therefore the child's birth
had not been concealed although the husband did not know precisely when it was born.1' - Feazel v. Feazelw held that adultery
at a time corresponding with the child's conception must be conclusively proven without the wife's testimony and that concealment must be shown by evidence indicating not only the husband's ignorance of the child's birth but also the wife's intent
to conceal it. 1' The later case of Williams v. Williams,'1 8 however, suggested that the husband's proof of adultery and concealment was insufficient to disavow the child; he must also prove
"remoteness" sufficient to make cohabitation physically impossible.' 9 Trahan v. Trahan20 is the most recent illustration of
what evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption of the
husband's paternity.
Statements of the Wife. - Trahan continued the flight from
evidence and closed several doors Feazel left open.2 ' Feazel had
suggested that the wife's registering the child as born of father
(husband in South Carolina; wife in Kentucky). In all cases the children were
declared to be the offspring of the husband, the remoteness being insufficient to
make cohabitation impossible. None of these cases, however, was an action en
desaveu, and in none had the husband disavowed the child. Under the jurisprudence cited in note 72 infra, the legitimacy of the children was not open to challenge.
14. 184 La. 837, 167 So. 747 (1936).
15. For the proposition that successful concealment of pregnancy was necessary, the court relied on Baudry-Lacantinerie. See 1 BAUDRY-LACAN TINERIE,
PRECIS DR DROIT CIVIL no 781 (14th ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE].
Modern French doctrine and practice is contra. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
16. 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952).
17. The court demanded explicit proof of time, place, and accomplice to show
adultery. The court relied in part on 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE no 781. The case
was criticized in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953
Term-Persons, 14 LA. L. REV. 114, 121 (1953).
18. 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956).
19. The case has been understood to mean that exclusionary blood tests cannot be used as evidence at all in an action en desaveu. Note, 17 LA. L. REV. 494
(1957).
20. 142 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
21. In Trahan the child was born eighteen months after a voluntary separation. Although the husband had visited his children twice each month, the testimony of both husband and wife that they had not cohabited since the separation
was confirmed by her parent's testimony that the husband and wife had never
been alone together during his visits. The wife, a large woman whose pregnancy
was not obvious, never told her husband that she was pregnant and denied it when
questioned by her mother and employer. She registered the child as born of father
unknown.
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unknown was strong evidence of concealment of birth.2 2 Trahan
held that neither this act by the wife nor her denials of pregnancy can be used as evidence of concealment since they are
"statements" and a wife is not permitted to bastardize her issue
by her statements.

23

The soundness of the supposed rule is debatable.2 4 There is
no legislative basis for the rule advanced in Trahan.25 The original doctrine was taken from Toullier 26 and introduced into Louisiana in the curious case of Tate v. Penne,27 in which a mother
attempted to revoke a donation to her daughter by alleging the
child's illegitimacy. The original concept was that a child's
status was fixed by operation of law at the moment of the child's
birth and therefore was unalterable by any device of human
will.28 To the original concept was added the thought that the

husband alone has a right to bring an action en desaveu; and if
he decides not to do so, neither the wife nor anyone else may
22. 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952). The court relied on 1 BAUDRYn* 781 and said that by naming her husband as the child's father
on the birth certificate the wife refutes any notion of concealment. There is a
further hint that if the child is delivered in a hospital there is no concealment
of birth.
23. 142 So. 2d 571, 574 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
24. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1952-1953 TermPersons, 14 LA. L. REV. 114, 121 (1953).
25. The mother's testimony is definitely evidence in certain cases to prove
natural paternal descent. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 210 (1870). Her testimony
apparently would be admitted to prove legitimate filiation under Article 196.
The rule that the wife's statements cannot bastardize her issue is similar to the
Lord Mansfield rule at common law. The Lord Mansfield rule forbids either
spouse to testify to their nonaccess if the child's legitimacy is at issue. Other
testimony by the parents is permitted, even if it establishes the illegitimacy of the
child. See 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 90 (1957). JACOBS & GOEBEL, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 850 (4th ed. 1961) lists Smith v. Smith, 214 La. 881, 39 So. 2d 162 (1949)
as a perversion of the Lord Mansfield rule. 7 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2064 (3d ed.
1940) severely criticizes the rule, and it is slowly yielding in common law jurisdictions. For cases admitting the wife's testimony, see Nulman v. Cooper, 120 Colo.
98, 207 P.2d 814 (1949) ; Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115 (D.C. 1951) ;
Evans v. State ex rel. Freeman, 165 Ind. 369, 75 N.E. 651 (1905) ; Commonwealth v. Leary, 185 N.E.2d 641 (Mass. 1962) ; Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383,
172 So. 317 (1937) ; In re Wray's Estate, 93 Mont. 525, 19 P.2d 1051 (1933)
Loudon v. Loudon, 114 N.J. Eq. 242, 168 Atl. 840 (1933).
LACANTINERIE

26. 1 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n

859 (6th ed. 1846)

(hereinafter

cited as TOULLIER).
27. 7 Mart.(N.S.) 548 (La. 1829).
28. 1 TOULLIER no 859. Toullier was speaking of extrajudicial declarations
and may have meant nothing more than an action en desaveu or some other form
of judicial action was essential to establish the illegitimacy of a child born of a
married woman. The French commentators reject the wife's confession to prove
adultery on the theory that passion or a spirit of vengeance may cause her to lie.
See 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE n 781; 1 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL no 156 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as CAanONIER] ; 1 PLANIOL n 1436; 1 TOULLIER n ° 814. No

statement by a Louisiana court suggesting this as a reason for excluding the wife's
testimony was found.
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thereafter question the child's paternity.29 Feazet severed the
rule from its rationale and applied it for the first time to an
action en desaveu.30 Trahan widened the separation by holding
in effect that a child's birth certificate may not be used as evidence of its illegitimacy. 81 It is submitted that the rationale of
the rule that a wife's statements cannot bastardize her issue
makes it inapplicable to the action en desaveu,3 2 and its use
should be restricted to cases in which a child, never disavowed,

is asserting or defending its legitimacy against attack by one
other than the husband of the mother.
Remoteness. - Trahan recognized in dictum that Article 188
of the Civil Code permits an action en desaveu if the child is
born 300 days after voluntary separation, provided the husband
proves non-cohabitation during the separation. 3 However, the
court then severely restricted this possibility by declaring that
non-cohabitation can be proved only as provided in Article 189:
showing sufficient "remoteness" between husband and wife to
make cohabitation physically impossible. 4 As primary authority
for the latter proposition the court relied upon the early case of
Tate v. Penne,3 5 which may no longer accurately reflect the law.
29. In this form it has been applied in a variety of cases. E.g., State v. Randall, 219 La. 578, 53 So. 2d 689 (1951) (criminal neglect of family) ; Smith v.
Smith, 214 La. 881, 39 So. 2d 162 (1949) (custody of child) ; Evans v. Roberson,
176 La. 280, 145 So. 539 (alimony for illegitimate child) ; Succession of Barth,
178 La. 847, 152 So. 543 (1934) ; Beard v. Vincent, 174 La. 869, 141 So. 862
(1932); Succession of Flynn, 161 La. 707, 109 So. 395 (1926); Succession of
Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892) ; Dejol v. Johnson, 12 La. Ann. 853
(1857) ; Eloi v. Mader, 1 Rob. 581 (La. 1841) (successions).
30. 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952). The court, without indicating it was
making an entirely new application of the rule, cited Smith v. Smith, 214 La.
881, 39 So. 2d 162 (1949) ; Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872
(1892) ; Tate v. Penne, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 548 (La. 1829).
31. But see Succession of Jacobsen, 182 La. 151, 161 So. 185 (1935). A
German birth certificate labelled the child illegitimate. Although the child had a
reputation of legitimacy, the court declared the child illegitimate, because there
was no proof that its mother was married. That the birth certificate might be a
"statement" of the mother apparently did not concern the court.
32. That the husband alone has a right to bring an action en desaveu may be
a sound reason to exclude testimony of the wife which would controvert his
paternity in cases in which the child is asserting his legitimacy or in child custody
cases such as Smith v. Smith, 214 La. 881, 39 So. 2d 162 (1949) ; but it seems
illogical to say the same reason forbids use of her testimony in an action en
deaaveu when the husband is exercising his right to bring it.
33. 142 So. 2d 571, 575 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). The possibility was apparently first suggested in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1952-1958 Term-Persons, 14 LA. L. REv. 121, 123 (1953).
34. 142 So. 2d at 576.
35. 7 Mart.(N.S.) 548 (La. 1829). The court in Trahan commented that as
far as it could discover the Tate case had never been overruled, and quoted as
follows: "The legal presumption of the husband being the father, and of access
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Tate was based on the Civil Code of 1808,6 and it was not until
the 1825 Code that a husband was allowed to disprove paternity
if the wife committed adultery and concealed the birth of the
child. 87 Moreover, a concept mentioned in Tate - "moral impossibility" of cohabitation - had a precise nineteenth century
meaning related to disavowal for adultery and concealment:
after proving adultery and concealment, the husband must introduce evidence to establish a "moral impossibility" of cohabitation, for the "moral impossibility" disproved his paternity and
justified the disavowal.38 Tate refused to allow a "moral impossibility" to rebut the presumption of cohabitation during voluntary separation, and properly so since the 1808 Code allowed disavowal only for physical impossibility of conception during the
marriage. Such a refusal in Trahan cannot be so explained, however, for "moral impossibility" of cohabitation as a basis for disavowal of paternity was introduced by the 1825 Code and continued in Article 185 of the 1870 Code.
The TrahanIncongruity. - Not only is the origin of the doctrine that remoteness is an essential element of an action en
desaveu for adultery and concealment suspect, but also the consequences of the doctrine may be undesirable. Trahan is a model
illustration, for in a companion suit the husband was awarded a
separation from bed and board on grounds of living separate and
being presumed in cases of voluntary separation can only be destroyed by evidence bringing the parties within the exception the law has created to the rule,
namely the physical impossibility of cohabitation -the
moral will not do. (Tate
v. Penne, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 548, 555 (La. 1829)]." 142 So. 2d at 576. The physical
impossibliity to which Tate refers is separation by physical distance. The moral
impossibility would be any evidence, in the absence of physical impossibility,
which created a moral certainty that there had been no cohabitation.
36. 7 Mart.(N.S.) at 554. Apparently the court applied the law as expressed
by the 1808 Code because it was in force at the time of the child's birth. The
cited articles read as follows: La. Civil Code, p. 45, art. 7 (1808) : "The law
considers the husband of the mother as the father of all children conceived during the marriage. The law admits neither the exception of the wife's adultery
nor the allegation of the husband's natural or accidental impotence." Id. art. 10:
"The legitimacy of the child born three hundred days after the separation from
bed and board has been decreed, may .be contested, unless it be proved that access
has taken place between the husband and wife, since such decree, because it is
always presumed that the parties have obeyed the sentence of separation. But
in case of voluntary separation, access is always presumed unless the contrary be
proved." Id. art. 11: "The presumption of paternity as an incident to marriage
is also at an end, when the remoteness of the husband from the wife has been
such that co-haitation has been physically impossible."
The present code provisions on disavowal of paternity come from the English
text of La. Civil Code arts. 203-211 (1825).
37. La. Civil Code art. 204 (1825).
38. See 1 TOULLIER n°* 801-803, 812, 817. See also 1 PLANIOL no. 1437. The
term is seldom used by modern French writers.
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apart for more than one year, i.e., 365 days.3 9 The two cases are
contradictory. In order for the child to be legitimate, there must
be cohabitation between husband and wife no more than 300
days before the child's birth.40 Thus, if the child is legitimate,
there was cohabitation in fact within the year, necessarily excluding a living separate and apart which would permit a separation from bed and board. 41 Conversely, if there was in fact
the requisite living separate and apart, then ipso facto there
was no cohabitation and the child is illegitimate. The decisions
can be reconciled only by a complete divorce of the concept of
legitimacy from biological fact.
The Gillies Solution. - Gillies v. Gillies42 presented the same
problem as that involved in Trahan. The trial court had sustained an exception of no cause of action to the husband's suit
to disavow paternity of a child born 290 days after a divorce
granted for two-years separation on the rationale that the husband could disavow paternity only by proving "remoteness"-in
this case a legal impossibility because he and his wife had continued to live in the same city during the voluntary separation. 48
The appellate court, perhaps recognizing the incongruity which
would result if the child were now declared legitimate, solved the
problem by interpreting "remoteness" to mean distance in human relations rather than physical distance." The court should
be supported in its efforts to avoid the incongruity of such cases
as Trahan, but its holding should be resisted insofar as it suggests that the husband must prove "remoteness," however this
term be interpreted, in all actions en desaveu. Although the concept of "distance in human relations" should have a place in Louisiana law, its use in Gillies is contrary to prior jurisprudence
relative to the interpretation of "remoteness. '' 4 The concept
seems more properly applicable to rebut the presumption of co39. Trahan v. Trahan, 142 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
40. Three hundred days is the legal maximum for pregnancy. See LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 187, 188 (1870).
41. Id. art. 138. There would have been a reconciliation. See id. arts. 152-154;
Collins v. Collins, 194 La. 446, 193 So. 702 (1940). Even if the wife did not urge
the defense, it seems that the court on its own motion could dismiss the suit as
collusive.
42. 144 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
43. Id. at 895.
44. Id. at 896: "The aloofness and coldness of either party makes the remoteness of the huiband from the wife such that cohabitation is a physical impossibility."
45. See note 13 supra.
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habitation during voluntary separation than for use to prove
"remoteness" as used in Article 189.46
"Remoteness" Reconsidered
Apparently, the concept that the husband must prove "remoteness" to disavow for adultery and concealment was introduced by dictum in Williams v. Williams.4 7 The concept reflects
the idea that the code provisions not only establish when a husband may disavow paternity but also how he must disprove it.
It is submitted that this is a misconception. The present Article
185 suggests that upon proof of adultery and concealment the
husband is permitted to disprove his paternity. The article does
not indicate how he must do so. Both the French text of Louisiana's 1825 Code and the modern interpretation of the corresponding articles of the French Code Civil support the conclusion that once adultery and concealment are proved the husband
4
may present all credible evidence to disprove his paternity.
Action en Desaveu in France.- Disavowal for adultery and
concealment is interpreted to include three elements: adultery,
concealment of birth, and evidence indicating nonpaternity of
the husband. 49 Rejecting the argument that each element must
be proved independently, 50 the French courts and modern writers
46. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
47. 230 La. 1, 7, 87 So. 2d 707, 709 (1956) : "While an action en desaveu may
be based upon adultery in certain cases, the father contesting legitimacy must
prove that the 'remoteness of the husband from the wife has been such that
cohabitation is physically impossible.' " The court refers to Article 189 and to
Feazel, Lejeune, and Tate. In both Feazel and Lejeune the husband sought to
disavow paternity on grounds of adultery and concealment

and on grounds of

remoteness. The applicability of Tate has already been considered in text accompanying note 35 supra.
48. The French text, "[I]l sera admis 4 proposer tous les faits propres d
justifier qu'il n'est pas le pare," is translated in the English text to read: "[H]e
will be permitted to prove that he is not its father," losing the force of the
French text. A more literal translation is: "[H]e will be permitted to present
all appropriate facts to prove that he is not its father." For the interpretation
of the 'corresponding French Code provisions see text accompanying note 49 infra.
49. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 313; 3 BEUDANT, COURS DE DROIT FRANCAIS
no 1014 (1936) [hereinafter cited as BEUDANT] ; CARBONNIER no 154; 1 COLIN
ET CAPITANT, COURS tL]tMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL no 455 (11th ed. 1945) [hereinafter cited as COLIN ET CAPITANT] ; 1 MAZEAUD, LECONS DE DROIT CIVIL no 887
(1955)

[hereinafter

cited as MAZEAUD] ; 1 PLANIOL no. 1435; 2 PLANIOL ET
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS n"
802-805 (2d ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as PLANIOL ET RIPERT].

RIPERT, TRAIT]t

PRATIQUE

50. Contra, 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE n

781 which reflects the view of the

nineteenth century commentators. Cf. 3 Huc. COMMENTAIRE DE CODE CIVIL no 12
(1893) ; 2 MARCADII, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL n' 10 (1873) ; 1 TOULLIER nP'

812, 815.

1963]

COMMENTS

767

consider concealment to be the crucial element of the action :51
if the husband proves concealment and nonpaternity, in that
order, adultery is presumed.5 2 To prove concealment, the husband has only to show that his wife attempted to conceal her
pregnancy from him - regardless of her success - or that she
registered the child as born of a father unknown.5 3 To disavow
for adultery and concealment, the husband is never required to
prove "remoteness" in the sense of physical distance.5 4 Evidence
that the husband is not the father of the child includes the husband's advanced age or his bad health, domestic strife at the
time of the child's conception, a separation in fact, 55 exclusionary blood tests,5 6 and any other credible evidence the husband
can produce. 57 Furthermore, the French reasonably interpret
their provision for disavowal for remoteness;58 they do not re51. They reason that the birth of a legitimate child is a happy event, and

therefore if the wife conceals the birth of the child, she admits its adulterous
origin. See 3 BEUDANT n 1014; 1 CARBONNIER no 154; COLIN ET CAPITANT
na 455; 1 MAZEAUD n 887; 1 DE LA MORANDIERE, DROIT CIVIL no 714 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as DE LA MORANDIERE] ; 1 PLANIOL no. 1435; 2 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT n 805; ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, filiation legitime, § 4, n 152 (1952) and
mise a jour 1962, filiation legitime, § 4, no 150; Desbois, Jurisprudence FrancaisePersonnes et droits de famille, 58 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 86, 93
(1960); cf. 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE n 781.
°
52. See 3 BEUDANT no 1015; 1 MAZEAUD n 887; 1 DE LA MORANDIERE
no 714; 1 PLANIOL no. 1435; 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT no 805; ENCYCLOPEDIE

DALLOZ, filiation legitime, § 4, n 152 (1952) ; Desbois, Jurisprudence FrancaisePersonnes et droits de famille, 59 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 466, 472

(1961) ; Cf. 1 CARBONNIER n 154 (judge should reject husband's offer to prove
non-paternity if it appears concealment of birth was not inspired by adultery).
53. See 1 CARBONNIER no 154; 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT no 455; 1 MARTY ET
REYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL n 485 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MARTY ET REYNAUD] ;
1 MAZEAUD a" 887; 1 DE LA MORANDIERE no 714; 1 PLANIOL no. 1435; 2 PLANIOL
ET RIPERT n 805; ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, filiation legitime, § 4, n 166 (1952) ;

cf. Cour de cassation (ch. civ. Ire sect. civ.) 30 oct 1961, D.1962.J.702, note
Holleaux; Desbois, Jurispurdence Francaise-Personneset droits de famille, 60
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 290, 294 (1962) (proof of fraudulent intention by wife is indispensable but sufficient condition of proving concealment).
54. Cour de cassation (civ. Ire sect. civ.) 21 oct 1958, D.1959.S.41.
°
55. 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT n 455; 1 DE LA MORANDIERE n 714; 1 PLANIOL
no. 1437; 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT no 804; cf. 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE no 781.
56. 1 CARBONNIER no 154; 1 MARTY ET REYNAUD no 485; 1 MAZEAUD no 887; 1
DE LA MORANDIERE n 714; 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT n 804. Mazeaud reports that.
the Court de cassation has directed the triers of fact to reject the sereological
tests as the only evidence if the test is scientifically questionable. Apparently the
French courts do not allow an action en desaveu based on blood tests alone. This
parallels the holding of Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 87 So. 2d 707 (1956),
which could be interpreted to permit use of blood group tests in the same circumstances as the French courts permit their use. It was reported in Note, 17
LA. L. REV. 494, 497 (1957) that the use of blood tests in France was specifically
authorized by legislation in 1955. The French courts anticipated the legislation
by nearly twenty years. See ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, filiation legitime, § 4, n*.
185 (1952), reporting cases as early as 1937.

57. One irate husband was allowed to allege that the child resembled his wife's
lover. 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT n 455.
58. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 312.
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quire such physical separation that it was impossible for the
spouses to meet but only that the spouses in fact did not meet.5 9
It is submitted that the French interpretation, which operates to receive evidence, is more realistic than the Louisiana interpretation, which operates to exclude evidence.6 By the
French interpretation there seems small danger that any legitimate child will be disavowed. By the Louisiana interpretation
there seems great probability that children not in fact those of
the husband will join his legitimate children as forced heirs.
Was not the action en desaveu devised to prevent such an event?

The husband who brings an action en desaveu is not a moral
monster; he is an injured party attempting to protect himself
and his legitimate children from the pretensions of spurious offspring. His evidence should be heard and a remedy provided
without requiring of him the impossible task of proving remoteness in every case.
POSSIBLE REMEDY OTHER THAN ACTION EN DESAVEU
Since the requirements of proof in an action en desaveu are
so formidable, it may be asked if the husband has any other

remedy if he is not in fact the father of his wife's child. The
action en desaveu clearly is not the only mode of contesting
legitimacy. Legitimacy requires a valid marriage, proven filiation to a married woman, and paternity by her husband. 61 The
action en desaveu is applicable only to the third element; the
first two may be challenged in suits other than an action en desaveu. 2 Whether paternity may be challenged in another action
59. See 1 CARBONNIER no 154; 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT no 454; 1 MAZEAUD
no 885; 1 DE LA MORANDIERE n 713; 1 PLANIOL no. 1432; 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT
no 800. Carbonnier lists incarceration, service in the army, or abandonment of
the conjugal domicile as productive of sufficient remoteness, provided the spouses
did not in fact meet.
60. The clearest policy statement from a Louisiana court on the basis of their
severe interpretation of the Code is: "It has always been the policy of the Louisiana law to protect innocent children, born during marriage, against scandalous
attacks upon their paternity by the husband of the mother, who may be seeking
to avoid his obligations, or by third persons unscrupulously claiming the estate
of the husband after his death." Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1, 7, 87 So. 2d
707, 709 (1956). Query: If the husband is not in fact the father of the child,
what is his obligation toward it? Is not his paternity rather than the child's
innocence the foundation of his obligations?
61. Problems of legitimation and putative marriages are excluded from this
Comment.
62. See Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892) on the
action en ceontestation d'etat. Legitimacy was disproved in Succession of Jacobsen,
182 La. 151, 161 So. 185 (1935) by showing there had been no marriage; and
in Succession of O'Neil, 52 La. Ann. 1754, 28 So. 259 (1900) by showing lack
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depends on the scope of the presumption of the husband's paternity. By its terms, Article 184 applies to "all children conceived
during the marriage" ;63 but Article 197 allows proof against
legitimate filiation by evidence that the child is not that of the
husband of the mother.6 4 Unless the two articles are contradictory, each must be applicable in some situations. Both Louisiana and French interpretations of these provisions will be ex-

amined in search of a solution.
The Louisiana Interpretationsof Articles 184 and 197
Logically the husband need bring the action en desaveu only
if the child is within the statutory presumption of paternity. 65
To gain protection of the presumption the child must at least be
able to prove filiation to the husband's wife. 6 The Code allows
67
proof of maternal filiation by evidence from the public records,
by reputation of status," or by testimony. 9 The jurisprudence
allows proof of filiation by reputation of status only if evidence
from the public records is not available.7 ° For proof of filiation,
only the recitation of maternity - the mother's name - is significant in the registry of birth; for, regardless of the paternity
there alleged, the husband of the mother is presumed to be the
father of the child ;71 unless he timely disavows by judicial
action, the child's paternity is unassailable notwithstanding Arof filiation to the alleged mother. See generally 1 PLANIOL nos. 1380-1381.

63. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 184 (1870) : "The law considers the husband of the
mother as the father of all children conceived during the marriage."
64. Id. art. 197: "Proof against legitimate filiation may be made by evidence
that the plaintiff is not the child of the mother whom he pretends to be his,
and the maternity being proved, that he is not the child of the husband of the
mother." The present article is an inexact translation of the French text of La.
Civil Code art. 216 (1825). The French text "tous les moyens propres 6 constater"
is rendered by the single word "evidence." "All appropriate means to establish" is
a more literal translation which preserves the force of the French text.
65. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 184 (1870).

66. See Succession of Anderson, 176 La. 66, 145 So. 270 (1932) ; Boykin v.
Jenkins, 174 La. 335, 140 So. 495 (1932) ; 1 PLANIOL no. 1413.
67. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 193 (1870). See also LA. R.S. 40:159 (1950).
68. LA. CVIL CODE arts. 194, 195 (1870). The articles read as if proof by
reputation is complete proof both of maternal and paternal filiation. Accord, 1
PLANIOL nos. 1387-1390.
69. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 196 (1870).

70. See Succession of Rockwood, 231 La. 521, 91 So. 2d 779 (1956) ; Succession of Gaudinse, 187 La. 844, 175 So. 595 (1937) ; Succession of Jacobsen, 182
La. 151, 161 So. 185 (1935).
71. See Succession of Flynn, 161 La. 707, 109 So. 395 (1926) (wife's paramour registered as father; court declared child to be offspring of husband). Of.
Ezidore v. Cureau's Heirs, 113 La. 839, 37 So. 773 (1904) ; (child baptized as
child of paramour; held to be offspring of husband) ; Eloi v. Mader, 1 Rob. 581
(La. 1841) (same).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

ticle 197.72 It should be remembered that the action en desaveu
prescribes in either one or two months according to the circumstances. 73 The Louisiana interpretation compels a regular action
en desaveu regardless of the circumstances of the child's birth.
Interpretationof the CorrespondingArticles of the French Code
French law parallels Louisiana law in modes of proving maternal filiation and in presuming paternity by the husband of
the mother whenever the mother is identified by the act of
birth. 74 If the child's act of birth and reputation of status both
import legitimacy, his status can be challenged only by a timely
action en desaveu.75 However, if the child who can prove maternal filiation neither by act of birth nor by reputation of status
brings an action asserting his legitimacy, the French permit the
husband to defend by what amounts to an action en desaveu, but
which need not be brought within the prescriptive period of the
regular action en desaveu.76 This defense is permitted under
72. See Succession of Verrett, 224 La. 461, 70 So. 2d 89 (1954) ; State v.
Lemoine, 224 La. 200, 69 So. 2d 15 (1954) ; State v. Randall, 219 La. 578, 53
So. 2d 689 (1951) ; Smith v. Smith, 214 La. 881, 39 So. 2d 162 (1949) ; Evans
v. Roberson, 176 La. 280, 145 So. 539 (1933) ; Beard v. Vincent, 174 La. 869,
141 So. 862 (1932) ; Succession of Flynn, 161 La. 707, 109 So. 395 (1926);
Succession of Ledet, 122 La. 220, 47 So. 506 (1908) ; Ezidore v. Cureau's Heirs,
113 La. 839, 37 So. 773 (1904) ; McNeely v. McNeely, 47 La. Ann. 1321, 17 So.
982 (1895) ; Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872 (1892) ; Dejol v.
Johnson, 12 La. Ann. 853 (1857) ; Eloi v. Mader, 1 Rob. 581 (La. 1841) ; Jenkins
v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 158 So. 217 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935) ; Favre v.
Celotex Co., 139 So. 904 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932). "If a man can make himself
legally the father of a child by adoption or by acknowledgment of one illegitimate,
we can see no reason why he cannot do so by failing to disavow paternity of his
wife's child within the time allowed by law" was the comment of a federal court
in an extreme case. Ellis v. Henderson, 204 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1953). But
see Texas Co. v. Stewart, 101 So. 2d 222 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958) for the
proposition that if the wife enters a bigamous second marriage, Article 184 cannot be invoked to establish paternity of the first husband for a child born during
the second marriage. Thus, if the woman lives in open concubinage her children
have her husband for father; but if she goes through a bigamous marriage and
the man is in good faith, her children have the putative spouse for father.
73. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 191, 192

(1870).

74. The act of birth is roughly equivalent to the Louisiana birth certificate.
It is enough to prove filiation if the mother's maiden name appears on the act of
birth. If further evidence proves she was married when the child was born, the
presumption of her husband's paternity applies. See 3 BEUDANT n 977; 1
COLIN ET CAPITANT no 445; 1 MARTY ET REYNAUD no 467; 1 DE LA MORANDIERE
no, 688, 705; 1 MAZEAUD no 828; 1 PLANIOL nos. 1385, 1413; 2 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT no 741; ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, filiation legitime, § 3, nos 68, 70 (1952),
mise a jour 1962, filiation legitime, § 3, n 67.
75. FRENcH CIVIL CODE art. 322. The article provides that if the child's
reputation of status conforms to his act of birth, the child cannot prove a contrary status, nor may his status be challenged save by an action en desaveu. See
ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, filiation legitime § 3, n" 106-114 (1952).
If the child's
reputation of status does not conform to his act of birth, he may offer to prove
either filiation and his status may be challenged by interested parties. However,
paternity cannot be made an issue in such an action. Ibid.
76. See 3 BEUDANT ao 1025; 1 CARBONNIER n 154; 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT
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French Code Article 325 (of which Louisiana Civil Code Article
197 is an almost exact translation) on the rationales that a
child unable to prove maternal filiation by an act of birth was
either reported born of parents unknown or not registered at
all ;77 that adultery is the most plausible explanation of such
mysterious maternity ;78 that inability to prove maternal filiation either by act of birth or by reputation of status demonstrates the child's birth has been concealed.7 9 In essence, the disavowal in defense is a special case of disavowal for adultery and
concealment,8 0 differing from the regular action en desaveu as
it is not governed by the short prescriptive period. Thus in
France the aggrieved husband is not obliged to bring a timely
acton en desaveu if the child can prove maternal filiation only
by testimony.sl
It is unsettled in France to what extent the presumption of
the husband's paternity can be employed if there are conflicting
presumptions of paternity. The problem arises if the child cannot prove maternal filiation by act of birth or reputation of
status, but has been acknowledged by a third party. 2 The Cour
de Cassation refused to allow one husband to employ the presumption in a case in which husband, wife, and her paramour
were all certain that the child was not the husband's child ;83 but
on referral, the Cour d'Appel de Lyon allowed application of the
presumption because it was biologically possible that the husband was the father of the child. 4 In a later case, the Cour de
no 458; 1 MARTY ET REYNAUD n0° 490-492; 1 MAZEAUD no 888; 1 DE LA MORANDIE no 717; 1 PLANIOL no. 1459; 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT n 814. This interpretation of Article 325 appears as early as 1 TOULLIER n' 893-896.
77. The writers do not mention the possibility of lost records in this respect.
In such case, however, a legitimate child probably would enjoy a reputation of
legitimacy.
78. 1 CARBONNIERa n 154.
79. 1 MAZEAUD no 888.
80. See ibid. However, the husband has only the present evidence of his nonpaternity. He does not have to prove adultery, concealment, or physical impossibility of cohabitation. 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT n 814.
81. 3 BEUDANT n 1028; 1 MARTY ET REYNAUD n 493; 1 MAZEAUD no 888;
1 DE LA MORANDIERE n 718; 1 PLANIOL no. 146. French doctrine has been
notably unenthusiastic about the anticipatory disavowal, but it is well established
in the jurisprudence. See ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, filiation legitime § 5, no 437439, and § 6, no, 494-500 (1952).
82. See 1 MAZEAUD n 895.
83. Cour de cassation (Ire sect. civ.) 28 mai 1957 (Duran C. Mouchotte)
D.1958.J.89, note Tallon, and S.1958.J.81, note. The child had been registered
as born of father and mother unknown, after which the paramour had acknowledged the child as his natural child. The husband was asserting his paternity
and the child's legitimacy- the reverse of an action en de8aveu. See generally
Pascal, Who Is the Papa?, 18 LA. L. REv. 685 (1958).
84. Cour d'Appel de Lyon, 3 juin 1958 (Mouchotte C. Duran) D.1959.J.580,
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Cassation again refused to allow a husband to utilize the presumption, holding that there was such discrepancy between fact
and presumption that its application would be a fraud on the
85
law.
Applicability of Article 197 in Louisiana
In Trahan v. Trahans6 the plaintiff prayed to be adjudged
not the father of the child on the theory that the child's lack of
reputation of legitimacy enabled him to challenge its legitimacy
by any credible evidence under Article 197.87 In essence the husband urged that a regular action en desaveu was unnecessary.
The court held that Article 197 applied only when a child asserted its legitimacy and could not be used in an action en desaveu.5 5 The result can be supported on the facts of the case; the
child could prove filiation to the husband's wife by its birth certificate, and in such circumstances both Louisiana and France
apply the presumption of the husband's paternity. 9 It is suggested, however, that the interpretation of Article 197 should
be the same as the interpretation of French Code Article 325,
and the husband or his heirs should be allowed to disprove paternity in defense to a child's claim of legitimacy without resorting to the regular action en desaveu if the child cannot prove
maternal filiation either from the public records or by reputation of status. 90 The claim of legitimacy is so suspicious in such
circumstances that the husband should not be required to bring
note Nerson. Nerson concludes that the trier of fact will utilize the presumption
only if there is some verisimilitude between presumption and fact.
85. Cour de cassation (ch. civ., Ire sect. civ.) 14 Jan 1959 (Decagny C.

Moret) D.1959.J.15, note de la Manierre. The facts were similar to Duran C.
Mouchotte, note 83 supra. De la Manierre defends the Duran decision against
various criticisms, arguing that they were all based on a nineteenth century
conception of family which is out of touch with modern realities. Cf. Texas Co.
v. Stewart, 101 So. 2d 222 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958) for disposition of a Louisiana conflict-of-paternity case.
86. 142 So. 2d 571, 576 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
87. Plaintiff's argument above appears in his brief; the court did not discuss
it in the opinion.

88. Trahan v. Trahan, 142 So. 2d 571, 576 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
89. Louisiana: see notes 70 and 71 supra; France: see note 74 supra.
90. Such interpretation would form an exception to the jurisprudential rule,
established by the cases cited in note 72 supra, that if the husband does not disavow paternity, the child's legitimacy may not thereafter be questioned. Indeed,
it can be argued that the redactors of the Code intended Article 197 to have a
still wider scope, for they refrained from drafting any equivalent to Article 322
of the French Civil Code. See note 75 supra. As the Louisiana Code lacks any
equivalent article, there seems no legislative impediment to allowing a disavowal

in defense if the child can prove maternal filiation from the public records but
lacks a reputation of legitimacy. Justice might be better served by so doing in
cases such as Succession of Flynn, 161 La. 707, 109 So. 395 (1926)
birth certificate named wife's paramour as father).

(child's
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a timely action en desaveu1 The suggested interpretation would
make Articles 184 and 197 complementary instead of contradictory, and allow a reasonable disposition of extreme cases in
which the husband in all probability never learned of the child's
birth, 92 instead of making them monuments to the intransigence
of the law.
Karl W. Cavanaugh

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE STATUTES
PROHIBITING THE DISSEMINATION OF
BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION
The current widespread attention given the continuing
population growth by news media' and a growing interest among
a large segment of the married population in spacing family
development has lent new impetus to examination of the controversial subject of birth control. Current state statutory
provisions on the subject of contraceptives stem mainly from
the influence of the Federal Comstock Act of 1873,2 the first
important legislative effort in this area. 3 The federal provi-

sions seem absolute in their prohibitions on interstate distribution of contraceptive devices, 4 but judicial interpretation has
created many exceptions in favor of certain activities. 5 A ma91. LA CIVIL CODE art. 209(3) may be the basis of another exception to
Article 184 in cases in which the wife is living in open concubinage with a third
party at the time of the child's conception.
92. E.g., Ellis v. Henderson, 204 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Succession of
Ledet, 122 La. 220, 47 So. 506 (1908) ; Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433,
10 So. 872 (1892). If the husband in fact never learns of the child's birth, his
heirs should be permitted to bring a regular action en desaveu. See LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 192 (1870).
1. E.g., United States News & World Report, p. 68 (May 6, 1963).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1462 (1958).
3. See Stone & Pilpel, The Social and Legal Status of Contraception, 22
N.C.L. REV. 212, 219-20 (1944), wherein the authors contend the Comstock Act
was archaic when passed, but that Congress was influenced by claims that the
nation was falling into the clutches of organized vice.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958): ". . . Every article or thing designed . . . for
preventing conception . . . [and] every description calculated to induce or incite
a person to so use or apply any such article . . . is declared to be nonmailable
matter.
... Id. § 1462: "Whoever . . . knowingly uses any . . . common carrier,
for [carriage in interstate commerce any article for preventing conception]."
5. See Stone & Pilpel, The Social and Legal Status of Contraception, 22
N.C.L. REV. 212, 221 (1944). When the Comstock Act was introduced it contained exceptions for articles of contraception when prescribed by a physician.
The law as passed, however, did not contain this exception. Judicial interpretation has read many exceptions back into the law. E.g., United States v. One
Package, 86 F. 2d 737 (2d Cir. 1936) (physicians allowed to import or ship by

